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Sensitive and Insensitive Causation
  
(1.1)    O(c)     O(e)
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1.   I  make  this  assumption  to  simplify  the  exposition  and  because  it  is  widely 
accepted. It  is problematic, particularly  in  indeterministic contexts (suppose (c)  is a 
toss of a genuinely indeterministic coin and (e) the event of its coming up heads), but 
nothing will turn on its correctness in what follows.
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ing  with  cases  of  preemption  and  overdetermination  by  controlling  for  alternative 
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6.   a  related  point  is  that  the  sensitivity  of  an  incomplete  generalization  or  an 
incomplete token causal claim will depend in part on how specific and fine-grained 
their  formulation  is.  If  the  generalization  specifies  that  if  Suzy  throws  a  rock  with 
exactly such and such momentum, then the bottle will shatter in exactly such and such 
a way (or if the causal claim is that Suzy’s throwing caused the bottle to shatter in exactly 
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8.   The  notion  of  “cognitive  impenetrability”  as  described  in  Pylyshyn  1984—
roughly  the  requirement  that  fundamental  generalizations  in  cognitive  science  be 
insensitive to changes in a subject’s beliefs and desires—represents yet another exam-
ple of a subject-matter-specific sensitivity condition.
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the  discriminations  we  do  among  causal  claims  involving  absences,  that  is,  why  we 
more readily regard some cases in which there is counterfactual dependence between 
an absence and an outcome as cases of causation than we do other such cases.
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a normal or default outcome and deviations  from  it. Given a healthy person who  is 
not under any obvious threat, the default outcome is that he or she continues to live 
through the next day. Death is a deviation from this default and particularly calls for 
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sensitive  to  contingency  information,  while  causal  perception  is  not  and  is  instead 
influenced by information about spatiotemporal contiguity and connecting processes. 
Thus the claims made above about the priority of contingency information seem true 
in general  for  casual  judgment but not  for  causal perception.  See Schottmann and 
Shanks  1992  for  additional  discussion.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  empirically 
grounded  causal  perception/judgment  dissociation  seems  to  closely  track  the  con-
trast in the philosophical literature between causal process theories and theories (like 
counterfactual accounts) that emphasize the idea that causes are difference makers.
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20.   Is  there  some other way of  explaining  the problematic  status of  (5.1) with-
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of production. For what  it  is worth, however,  I am inclined  to  think  that  transitivity 
is  not  a  reasonable  condition  to  impose  on  any  concept  of  causation,  for  reasons  I 
describe in woodward 2003, 57–59.
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Figure 1.  Gene-Environment Interaction
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31.   For  some broadly  similar  remarks,  see Sterelny 1996. However,  I would not 
endorse  Sterelny’s  distinction  between what  he  calls  “actual  sequence”  and  “robust 
process” explanations.
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